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CHAPTER 4

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (3)

LEIBNIZ

§ 1

THE PROBLEM OF LEIBNIZ. THE HORIZON OF NOTHINGNESS.
POSSIBILITY

Leibniz also places himself on the horizon of nothingness. St. Thomas had seen inside that horizon, on a basic level, the intrinsic finitude of being. Descartes sees, on a primary level, the uncertainty of man who searches for clear and distinct ideas, who looks for evidences about truth and being. Leibniz places himself on this same horizon, but his stepping march is much different.

Leibniz tells us quite graphically that “Cartesianism, what is good about it, is actually at the antechamber of truth”. This means that for Leibniz it is not the case that Cartesianism may not be true, but that it is only the antechamber of truth. Therefore, Cartesianism must be lacking something that for Leibniz is decisive.

Indeed, for Descartes all philosophy is based, in one form or another, on the concept of clear and distinct ideas. However, for Leibniz, Descartes ignores {152} something, which is decisive in those clear and distinct ideas. The clear and distinct ideas are mine, but regardless how much they are mine they are ideas of something, and that “something”, obviously, is not mine. It is certain that this “something” is not simply the real thing, because there are many ideas of things that are not real; but in the objective terminus of an idea, if there is no real thing, there is, however, that which makes that the thing may be real.

Therefore, in the first place, the content of an idea represents that which is objective about the thing. In the second place, this objective of a thing is the possible about it. The idea of a glass of water is not really a glass of water, but the idea of a glass of water contains the objective possibility of that which in reality we call a glass of water. Therefore, in the idea there is a moment by virtue of which its terminus is the possible object, insofar as possible. According to Leibniz, Descartes has forgotten that to support all philosophy on ideas means to support the real upon the possible as its fundament.

As long as this is only applied to those things that surround man, it does not appear this is a far-reaching truth. Since the beginning of the world we are able to know that those things that eventually became things, did become things because they were possible. But Leibniz, influenced by the previous metaphysics, is going to realize an operation with a much greater task, not only a few things or many of them, but the entire real universe is possible before being real. This is what appears on the horizon of nothingness.

For St. Thomas, the horizon of nothingness highlights, in first place, the intrinsic finitude of being. For Descartes, nothingness highlights, in first place, the uncertainty of man amid his search for truths. For Leibniz, {153} it is the case of something different; on the horizon of nothingness he highlights, in first place, the possible as antecedent fundament of the real. This is what we must now proceed to consider with some precision.


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§ 2

THE STEPPING MARCH OF THE PROBLEM

To accomplish this, we are going to divide the analysis of the thought of Leibniz into three steps.

First. What is the objective content of an idea as possibility of the real?
Second. What are the consequences this conception of the objective content of an idea as possibility for the vision of things has?
Third. How does the philosophy of Leibniz regard the transcendental order?


I. Idea and possibility

The idea as possibility has two moments.

In the first place, the specifically Cartesian moment. Ideas have to be clear and distinct. Anything else would be not to move among ideas, but among confusions. But Leibniz understands that this clarity and distinctiveness must have a very precise character. Ideas are not limited to contain just a few clear and distinct notes, but these have to be precisely the requirements (requaesita) that correspond to the thing of which the idea is a concept; therefore, these requirements must be defined with rigor. The idea is clear and distinct when it is rigorously defined. What Descartes was missing was a definition, which is not just a logical enunciation, but the objective characteristic of a thing, which {155} is limited in its intrinsic condition of note and only insofar as it is defined, deserves the name of clear and distinct. As it has been remarked sometimes, the criterion of evidence of Descartes has nothing to do with the evident at all, and this is due to the fact that it lacks this moment of definition. Leibniz understands that it is necessary that the clarity and distinctiveness must be those of an idea rigorously defined.

But this, which is necessary, is not sufficient for Leibniz; there is an essential second moment. Not all notes, regardless of what they may be and even if rigorously defined and combined, are an idea of an objective terminus. For that it is necessary that these notes may be rigorously compatible among themselves. Compatibility is something that, according to Leibniz, completely escaped the perspicacity of Descartes. Not all notes clearly and distinctly perceived —not even if rigorously defined— constitute the objective terminus of an idea if they are not compatible among themselves. This is not just a question of definitions.

What does Leibniz understand here by “compatibility”? Compatibility means the intrinsic possibility of an object. Compatible notes make that of which they are compatible notes an intrinsically possible object. But now it is necessary to ask, what does Leibniz understand by “possibility”?

Classical philosophy, since the time of Aristotle, had spoken about potential being (dynámei ón), but that dýnamis only had two slopes. First, the capacity of producing something, for example, in a seed the tree that is going to be born from it is there under the form of a “force” (dýnamis). Second, it can have a different sense, that the same tree has a kind of pre-contained existence in the seed and this existence is called dynámei ón, the tree is nothing but potential or virtual.

{156} That is not the case here. Leibniz, under the decisive influence of Suárez, considers that compatibility is something more, and that it is intrinsic. This means that the object, in itself, is intrinsically possible as such. It is not only the case that there has to be a dýnamis capable of producing it or, therefore, that the terminus of that dýnamis may be virtually preexistent. It is also necessary that in itself it may have an intrinsic possibility.

What is that intrinsic possibility for Leibniz? Leibniz faithfully following Suárez will definitely tell us that the intrinsically possible is only anything, which intrinsically is not contradictory. That the notes may not be contradictory among themselves, is what makes something intrinsically possible. Let us understand that the absence of contradiction does not mean here an attribute of the judgment. It is not the case that when we predicate something about a thing our thinking may not contradict itself, because this is something derived. For Leibniz —and the same for Suárez— it is the case that the notes among themselves may exclude the moment of non-being by which they would be incompatible among themselves. The non-contradiction, the no that affects the intrinsic possibility, is the impossible no and that impossible is the contradictory. Because of this the non-contradiction is what constitutes the possible as such.

Nonetheless, according to Leibniz the idea that contains compatible notes, in the sense we have just indicated, is what rigorously constitutes a concept. Here Leibniz makes a distinction, taken —at least in its vocabulary— from Suárez. If we have an idea that meets all the conditions we have just outlined, then we have an apt concept (conceptus aptus) ... for what? Precisely to have reality. This is what turns the objective terminus into a possible. A concept that does not meet these conditions, but {157} because of a deficient intellectual analysis we were led to believe is apt, yet in the end is not because it is contradictory, would be an inept concept. Here we can clearly see how the terminus of possibility is antecedent of the real thing in the philosophy of Leibniz, just as it was in the philosophy of Suárez.

It is the case that being, the entity metaphysics deals with, is not actual being in its reality, but that which by aptness can have reality, can exist. The primary term upon which metaphysics rests is the possible insofar as possible, i.e., apprehended in an apt concept or if you will the objective terminus of an apt concept. It is true that between the apt concepts and the inept Leibniz is going to introduce a third category; for example, the things we perceive or imagine; but we shall not enter into this problem here. In such fashion, by one stroke, quite characteristic of his way of thinking, he will say that sensibility is purely and simply a confused intellection. This is such an ominous affirmation that will have to be discussed at the proper time. We shall put it aside for now.

The concept defined with rigor, the apt concept is what constitutes the ens possibile. This means that existing things, by virtue of this possible, realize what is contained in the possible as such. The possible contains the reply to what a thing is, it is an essentia. To incorporate all reality in an idea is not only to incorporate what exists in the possible, but also to make of the possible the very essence of what exists. This is to place essence prior to all existing things, and as fundament of that existence. The equation between possible object and essence is what confers its last precision on this matter to the thought of Leibniz.

Leibniz, however, cannot but ask himself, How do we form an objective concept from notes {158} compatible with these conditions? Leibniz will reply, simply by demonstration. Since it is the case of notes rigorously defined, it has to be a demonstration through definitions. Therefore, the priority of the possible over the existent is the priority of ideas over the real and therefore, the priority of essence over existence. This is absolutely decisive for the way in which Leibniz is going to understand the real with respect to the possible.

Before we begin to elaborate, let us stop and make some reflections that this exposition of the metaphysics of Leibniz suggests.

In the first place, with respect to the idea of contradiction. The principle of contradiction is a principle that for very good reasons has been making the rounds of metaphysics since the times of Aristotle who enunciated it explicitly. But Aristotle was referring with this principle to a principle of “diction”, i.e., that the logos could not contradict itself. However, here something more is being said. It is said that contradiction —or the non-contradiction— is a structure of reality itself, which could not be affirmed without also saying that entity —real or possible— has the same structure as the logos. But then, is this correct? Because, if it were not, contradiction would not be useful to qualify the real thing. The real thing, strictly speaking, is not contradictory or non-contradictory; it is what it is and nothing more. Contradiction is on the part of the logos, which enunciates or affirms something of the thing that exists; but the moment of no has no positive reality in things. Be that as it may, that horizon of nothingness has been penetrating and soaking all things and we find as the most natural thing in the world to say that things have an aspect of being and an aspect of non-being. But things are actually what they are and that is where their function ends. {159} In Leibniz as in Suárez it is difficult to maintain contradiction as something that belongs to being.

In the second place, we are told that this non-contradiction is an internal possibility of a thing. But, what do we understand here by “internal possibility”? We have already seen it, what is not impossible. What does this “impossible” mean? That it cannot be realized by potency? But, in that case, the possibility open to the dimension of contradiction and non-contradiction is the possibility of an intellective potency, capable to know and produce the thing; it does not belong to the internal structure of the thing. Definitely, the possibility of something, the essence of a thing, is not composed only of notes that are not incompatible, but possesses an intrinsic and internal unity by virtue of which this thing has its own possibility and when it is realized, has its own entity. This is an idea we shall encounter further on in the Leibniz philosophy, but which is now eliminated completely from his consideration of essences. The internal and primary unity is something positive, not merely negative. Who has ever said that this primary and positive unity is intrinsically qualified by a non-contradiction or, to put it simply, by diction, by a légein, of any kind at all?

Furthermore, just like philosophy since the XVI century, Leibniz has shuffled two notions that, however, are different. It is clear that we can talk about the objective possibility of something. But “objective possibility” of something, does it mean a possible object? That is a different question. The possibility that there may be an object does not mean that there may be a possible object to which the real object is nothing but the addition of an existence to that which is the possible object insofar as possible. The “possibility” of an object is one thing, and a possible “object” is definitely something else. It has as much of {160} incontrovertible to say that before the reality —at least, simultaneously with it— there has to be an objective possibility, as it has of problematic to talk about a possible “object” that, as such an object, might be anterior to reality. Perhaps all the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent (+1293) gravitates over the philosophy of Leibniz. To create is not to add an existence to an essence, but to fully place in reality an existing essence, with all its essence and its existence. Anything else is a fiction that, in the end, is somewhat anthropomorphic. The proof is that, when Leibniz requests that the compatibility of the notes has to be demonstrated, is such a demonstration possible?

The famous Gödel theorem demonstrated that in mathematics with a finite body of axioms we would never be able to demonstrate that its conclusions will not be contradictory. It might be said that this demonstration is rigorous, and therefore, based on the principle of contradiction, but it is a principle of contradiction, which refers to the légein, i.e., to the mind of the one who demonstrates it. From the objective point of view, there is no possibility for demonstrating the non-contradiction of a finite body of axioms. Consequently, compatibility is not based on contradiction, but just the opposite; non-contradiction is based on compatibility.