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b) Nevertheless, though essentially different, the two attitudes are not disconnected from each other, not even when it is the case of truths, which are not demonstrably knowable. Actually, any surrender, as we have pointed out, presupposes, or if one wish, carries in itself, a certain intellection of that to which man surrenders; any faith entails a non-visual intellection, an intellection of the auditive type as announcement and “as towards”. Otherwise, there would be no possibility of surrender. This issue comes to a head when dealing with truths of which there is precise demonstrative knowledge, as in the case of the existence of God. Therefore, the connection between reason and faith is found to be formally anchored within intellection and not outside it. Hence, faith and reason do not primarily constitute two diverse domains, the domain of reason and the domain of faith, but two different functions of intelligence itself. Which are they?

As we have discussed, intellection consists in the actuality of what is intellectively known in the intelligence. And therefore, the function of intelligence always depends upon the characteristics of that which is known intellectively. When that which is known intellectively is a reality-object, the function of intelligence consists in discovering it and “leaving it” in front of us, according to what it is in and by itself. But if that which is known intellectually is reality-fundament, the intelligence has a dual function, or better still, a complex function. On one hand, it discloses reality to us, and on the other, not only leaves it in front of us, but opens for us the ambit of fundamentality, that ambit where I can and must anchor my reality in its fundament, i.e., it makes it possible for me to make that fundamentality mine. Strictly speaking they are not two functions, but the complexity of a function determined by the foundational characteristics of that which is intellectively known. They would be two functions if {236} fundamentality were a characteristic extrinsic to the presence of reality-fundament. This is what might occur if it were the case, for example, of supporting oneself upon a reality-object in order to do something with it in life. Then reality is object and in addition it is useful for doing something. But this is not a reality-fundament. Reality-fundament is not a reality present as an object which in addition to, and extrinsic to its mode of presence, may have a foundational characteristic. Reality-fundament is a reality whose own mode of presence in intellection consists, formally and intrinsically, in being foundational. Then its actuality in intellection discovers for us reality on one side, but on another it places us eo ipso in the ambit of fundamentality. The unity of the functions does not lie in their convergence on the same object, as is the case with the reality-object, but is a unity in the intellection itself: the discovery of reality is formally the outline of the ambit of fundamentality. Such is the case with the intellection of God. God is present to us in intellection, in the “towards” of the religating power of the real. Intellection has “hurled us towards” Him as realitas fundamentalis, as absolutely absolute reality, foundational of my relative absolute being. Intellection, therefore, discovers God for us in and by Himself, but does so by opening the ambit of the fundamentality of my I. Hence, I know in a rigorously intellectual way, the reality of God; but this knowledge is in itself the opening to the ambit of fundamentality. To be sure, it is not by such knowing that I make this fundamentality mine —that would be faith—, but the knowing, inexorably, is what that I make of God, in and by Himself, the fundament of the construction of my I, what makes {237} a faith possible. Whence it follows that the possibility of this faith is not something we have “in addition” to knowledge of the reality of God, but that the knowledge is intrinsically and formally the opening to the ambit of a possible faith. It is not the convergence of two attitudes upon the same object, but the unity of two attitudes qua attitudes. It is knowledge, which qua knowledge constitutes the ambit of the possible faith qua faith. The knowledge of God is already in itself, qua knowledge, a possible faith.

To be sure, we said earlier that faith and knowledge are two different attitudes, which are so distinct as to be separable. This would seem to contradict what we have just said, i.e., the affirmation that knowledge is in itself, and formally the opening to the ambit of surrender, of faith. But the contradiction is only apparent. Formally the knowledge and the opening to the ambit of faith are one. Yet the ambit of faith is not faith itself. This and the other possible attitudes of man when confronting God are irreducible to knowledge, but it is essential to knowledge to make them possible. All of them are inscribed in the same ambit, and in this sense knowledge, and ambit belong to each other inexorably. So much so, that man may be able to take many attitudes in it, but must inexorably take just one, after he has known God. He may choose not to concern himself with God, but this non-concern is a positive act; it is not a mere abstention from acting, but an act of abstention, and therefore an attitude. The ambit is not faith, but is the possibility of faith, and any other attitude. What is consubstantial to the knowledge of God is the possibility of faith. The truth of God is the real truth of an absolutely absolute person, and {238} therefore knowledge of Him is eo ipso the ambit of surrender, of faith.

This is why I consider insufficient the classical conceptions of the connection between reason and faith (as it is usually termed), which have been circulating since the times of Tertullian and St. Augustine. One side has placed the accent on faith, credo ut intelligam, I believe in order to (ut) understand; the other has placed more emphasis on reason, intelligo ut credam, I understand in order to (ut) believe. But regardless of how one chooses to weigh these two, the question still remains: Is this what is primary in the connection between knowledge and faith? From my point of view it is not, because in those conceptions it is presupposed that “connection” means “way”: faith as the way “towards” (ut) knowledge or knowledge as the way “towards” (ut) faith. But to be a way is not the primary connection between knowledge and faith. If we place this question on a somewhat external plane, it is true that when dealing with mysteries, which intelligence does not reach demonstratively, one might be able to refer to this as a “way”. But beneath this consideration more radical questions appear. In the first place: How is that “way” possible? Upon what is the unity of the “way” based? We are not told. Indeed, it would be impossible for a term to connect to another if a common dimension did not exist in which the way in question could be traced. But then it becomes clear that it is within this common dimension that we find eo ipso that which is primary about the connection we are seeking. Now, this common dimension is the intellection as “towards”, the presence as “towards” of God. From this it follows that the connection between knowledge and faith is the unity of two functions, or better still, the unitary complexity of one self-same function of intellection. And the proof resides, in the second place, on the fact that the problem of the {239} connection between knowledge and faith is not posed only with respect to incomprehensible truths like the mysteries, but most radically and basically, from my point of view, with respect to truths like the existence of God, which can be known demonstratively. The radical connection between knowledge and faith with respect to the truth of the existence of God, is found in the fact that because it deals with a reality-fundament, the proof of the existence of God establishes the ambit of the possible surrender to God. It is no longer the case of a “way”, which goes from knowledge to faith and from faith to knowledge, but of the unity of the fundamental characteristic of the reality of God present in one self-same intellection. And in this unity is founded the connection, which has the type of a “way”, i.e., of the type “ut” (in order to) when dealing with undemonstrable truths. In them there is always an intellection; and if faith is the way “towards” knowledge or the latter “towards” the former, this unity of “viability” is only possible when founded upon the most primary and radical unity I have just presented: the unity of knowing, and the ambit of surrender in the intellection of the reality-fundament in which God consists for us. Any truth of religious mysteries, however “mysterious” it may be, is always presented to us as a truth from God to man; therefore, the unity of knowledge and faith in these truths is inscribed, and founded in the unity of knowledge and faith such as it exists in the truth about God.

In summary, intelligence and faith, or rather, knowledge and faith are essentially different, but are essentially connected in the intellection of God: this is the unity in God as reality-fundament, the unity of knowledge and the ambit of surrender. But this ambit of surrender is not the surrender {240} itself; it is only the possibility of the surrender. It is certain by virtue of this unity that man finds himself inexorably forced to assume an attitude with respect to God, whose existence he knows demonstratively. But this attitude, as we have said, is not necessarily the attitude of surrender, of faith. Man can assume and in fact does assume other attitudes. With respect to all of them, the unity of knowledge and ambit of surrender is just their most radical possibility. Then, we can do no less than ask ourselves the question of the radical characteristic of that forcefulness, i.e., of that which determines the step from its possibility to the reality of an attitude. Only then we shall be able to fully state the truth of the existence of God is “at one and the same time” a truth of reason, and a truth of faith. This is the second of the two important questions concerning intelligence and faith, which we posed at the beginning of this paragraph. The first was the question of the difference, and unity between intelligence and faith. The second is the question of the radical characteristic of the “at one and the same time” of intelligence and faith.

2. Actual radical unity of intelligence and faith. We have just viewed the radical unity of intelligence and faith, but only as a possibility. Therefore, the radical unity we have been describing is only a possible unity. We need to take a further step. We need to proceed beyond the possibility of surrender to the actual surrender. That is, we must describe precisely the characteristic of that by virtue of which the possibility acquires actual reality.

Clearly, the character of this factor depends essentially upon the nature of what we understand by “possibility”. And although we have already made reference to them in some form throughout the last few pages, it will not be superfluous to carefully collect some of the concepts, which have been appearing along the way, {241} orienting them towards the theme that concerns us now. Although that theme is the knowledge of God, what we are going to develop is neither exclusively nor preferentially proper to the knowledge of God, but concerns all knowledge as such.

As we have just said, the intellection of any reality is always, in some form, the intellection of reality “as towards”. And the terminus to which we proceed in this “towards” is never univocally determined by reality itself. Unless the question is clarified further, several different forms of termini for the “towards” present themselves. From this it follows that what an intellection as “towards” formally does is to open in front of intelligence an ambit of different possible determinations of the real. The indetermination of the terminus of the “towards” consists in being ambit. The real correlate of the “towards” is, therefore, ambit.

But this is not enough. What is the type of ambit of this “towards”? Above all, it is an ambit of several termini. And these termini are, thus far, just possible termini. Here “possible” means that unless the matter is not “resolved”, these termini are possible real things. The ambit, therefore, is an ambit above all of possible real things. But not only this, because reality as “towards” not only opens the ambit of real possible things, but hurls us to it. Intelligence, actually, has to move in this ambit. These motions are, therefore, my motions; each one with its own direction. And insofar as this direction is not univocally determined, it is not only a possible direction in the abstract, so to speak, but is a possibility of mine for direction. In this aspect, the ambit offers several possibilities of intellection {242} from my side. The terminus of the ambit is not only possible real things, but also and “at one and the same time” with them, my own real possibilities. We shall soon see the characteristic of such “unity”. Therefore, a possibility of mine is a possibility to realize myself in a certain way, i.e., a possibility to realize my own being. The possibilities offered by the intellection as “towards” constitute a possibility of my self-realization. No knowledge, regardless of how remotely placed it may be from human reality, for example an abstract theorem in mathematics, is exempt from this condition. Real possible things open the ambit of my real possibilities, and at the same time these possibilities can determine, in one form or another, the real possible things.

What is essential for us now, are these possibilities and what is the characteristic of the realization of the possible qua possible. There is a different characteristic depending on whether we are dealing with possible real things or with my own real possibilities. Concerning a possible thing, its realization depends purely and simply upon the actualization of those potencies thanks to which the thing in question is possible. But when dealing with possibilities of mine it is not enough with the actuation of potencies. Between these and actual reality something different mediates: my appropriation of that possibility. The possibilities turn into actual reality not only by the actuation of previous potencies, but above all by appropriation. If can also be stated this way, actualization incorporates in the potencies an intrinsic moment of appropriation. On the previous pages we spoke about acceptance, to make a possibility mine, etc., adding that in this is what surrender consists. We were doing nothing, but anticipating the more precise concept of appropriation. The very essence itself of surrender is appropriation, and conversely {243} appropriation is the surrender of personal reality to a certain type of possibility, and therefore, to one’s own particular way of being.

And so, man not only de facto appropriates possibilities, but inexorably has to appropriate some, because every appropriation is one determination of my mode of being instead of others. And in this is what volition formally consists. Volition is ultimately and radically the determination of one possibility as a mode of my being. That upon which volition formally rests qua volition, is the possibilities, and to desire them is to appropriate them. In this dimension the possibility involves and goes beyond the distinction between ends and means. The ambit of possibilities is eo ipso an ambit of volition. And since the possibilities are diverse, any appropriation is necessarily an option. Thus, the forcefulness to make my being opens the ambit of the possibilities of being; this forcefulness then carries an option; and the option realizes the possibility by appropriation. Forcefulness, option, appropriation: here we have the formal structure of the step from possibilities to actual reality.

But let us not forget the point of departure of these considerations. We started from the intellection of God, and we inquired about the actual radical unity between knowledge of God and free faith in Him. At bottom, we now realize, is the problem of the unity of intellection and of appropriation in the determination of my being. And though it may seem paradoxical, this unity is found precisely in free option. The option, actually, is an option of something intellectually known, and intellection is intellection of something being opted as a possibility of mine. A possibility of what? We have just mentioned it: a possibility of my being, therefore, of being relatively {244} absolute. Consequently, if we call an option, as it should be called, “will”, it follows that the radical unity between knowledge of God and faith in God, is inscribed precisely and formally in the will to be. Let us understand it well: this is not something that belongs exclusively to the theological problem we have been studying, but rather is an essential structure of any knowledge, be it or not a knowledge of God.

What is this will? It is not the mere tendency to be or the mere appetite of being. Certainly, not all my being is optionally determined; all my substantive reality, my appetites and all tendencies, and not just the optative, configure my being. But the fact of the matter is that just as stimulation itself opens the door to the awareness of reality for the intelligence, so also the tendency to be opens at certain levels the function of opting. To opt is not only a question of tendency, just as intellective knowing is not only a question of sensing. And as intelligence is sentient, in like manner the will is tendent. Nonetheless, sensing is not intellective knowing, nor is tending or having apetite willing. Now, to opt is only possible by virtue of the function of the intelligence. From this follows that even though opting is compelled by the necessity of being relatively absolute, nonetheless, the terms of volition are opened by intellection. And since what is proper to intellection is to actualize the real in which real truth consists, it follows that what the will to be has of volition and not of apetite, is to be supported in one form or another upon truth. The will to be qua will is, therefore, formally will to truth. Therefore, the radical unity of knowledge of God and faith in Him, consists in will to truth. To understand this we must examine three questions:

A) What is this will to truth? {245}
B) What is the unity of knowledge and faith in God in the will to truth?
C) What is the will to truth in human reality?
I will repeat this ad nauseam: these are questions, which do not belong exclusively to the knowledge of God, but concern the essence of any knowledge as such.

A) The will to truth. It will be necessary to conceptualize with some rigor what this will to truth is. Otherwise the second question runs the risk of loosing itself in empty vagaries. Therefore, I ask forbearance for this somewhat detailed explanation of purely philosophical character.

The expression “will to truth” has several meanings. In the widest sense, “will to truth” means what we have just indicated: the fact that our tendency or appetite moves itself within what intelligence proposes, and which in the widest sense may be called “the true”. Here “true” means that whatever determines the will is known intellectually as “being” in one form or another, ignoring whether it actually is so. Therefore, in this context, “truth” means only that in some measure or another, the will determines itself by knowing that about which it determines itself, and that this knowledge counts as one of the essential motives for the determination. For this reason I speak about “the true”, without further qualifications, as a synonym for “the known”, and as a synonym for knowing that something “is”. In this widest sense, will to truth is a pleonasm, because the will formally consists in determining itself within “the true”. More than will to truth, this is the very definition of will as differentiated from mere tendency. It is, fundamentally, the idea which classical philosophy formulated about the will: rational appetite. I consider this concept of {246} will to be inadequate; however, we need not enter into a discussion of the matter here.

Although not the widest, there is still a wide sense, according to which the will to truth does not merely consist in moving within the ambit of the true, but in proposing to itself something that may “truly” be. Above, truth was ambit; now it is terminus of volition. Truth consists here not in merely being known, but in “truly” being as distinguished from what is only “in appearance”. To wish appearances only is to wish deceit. Man can very well have the will to deceive others or to deceive himself. Thus, the will to truth consists in veracity as opposed to deceitfulness. This is, at bottom —only at bottom— what Nietzsche understood by will to truth (Wille zur Wahrheit): veracity (Wahrhaftigkeit) towards others or towards oneself. This second meaning presupposes the first: clearly veracity and deceit are possible only within what we have called the ambit of the true.

The expression “will to truth” is nowadays employed everywhere with these two senses mixed indiscriminately. But there is a third sense, which, I think, is the strict meaning of the will to truth. Here, “truth” does not mean either what is true or what is truly, but something much more modest, though much more radical: the actuality of the real in intelligence. This is what I have repeatedly termed “real truth”. What is “true” and what is “truly” are inscribed in real truth. Only because the real is actual in the intelligence, i.e., only because apprehending the real as real is the essence of intelligence, it can and must elaborate ideas, assemble arguments, delineate projects, etc.; “the {247} true” presupposes real truth, and is only possible through it. Likewise, the difference between being “truly” and being only “in appearance”, is only possible because of real truth: to be truly, and to be appearance, are differences of the real actually present in intelligence. Therefore, the will to truth is primarily and formally will to real truth. What is this will?