{247} (cont’d)

In order to clarify it, let us recall that real truth, despite the simplicity of its definition, has an enormous inner richness. This is because real truth, i.e., the actualization of a real thing in intelligence, has three dimensions. Above all real truth consists in the patency of the real thing in the full richness of its notes. In the second place, we say that a real thing is true when we can depend on it, because its truth consists, in this dimension, that the thing is, and operates in accordance with the being of what its notes offer: this is the firmness. Finally, truth means that the real is in fact real when it is in a certain way, commonly referred as “real and effective”. Patency, firmness, and facticity are three different dimensions to be sure, but essentially inseparable. Man may pay more attention to one than the other two, but the three of them always exist because their intrinsic unity constitute the very essence of real truth.

This granted, we ask, What is the will to real truth? At first sight, such a will may appear as something impossible because it concerns the structure of the intellectual act itself, and therefore of something prior to any volition. Nevertheless, it exists, because real truth is not only a beginning of an intellectual process, but a principle of every act of intelligence of that process. If it were nothing but beginning, real truth would {248} only belong to a very remote past. But as principle, real truth is always present: every act of an intellectual process is supported by the presence of real truth. Reality, in fact, is present to us in primordial apprehension and in the whole intellective process in a variety of ways, and one of them is “as towards”. Thus, reality itself in its real truth propels us to “ideate”, encompassing in this term “ideate” all the many types of intellective processes that man has to perform (conceive, judge, reason, plan, etc.), and the real truth, which propels us to ideate eo ipso opens the ambit of two possibilities. One, is to repose upon ideas in and by themselves as if they were the canon of reality itself; taken to the limit, one ends by making ideas the true reality. The other is the inverse possibility, to address reality itself, and take ideas as organs, which hinder or facilitate to make reality ever more present in the intelligence. Guided by things and their real truth, intelligence enters deeper and deeper into the real, and achieves an increment of real truth. Man has to opt for one of these two possibilities, i.e., he has to accomplish an act of the will: this is the will to truth. Real truth is certainly a constitutive moment of intellection as such; but takes us inexorably to the will to truth, precisely and formally because actualized reality in primordial apprehension is reality “as towards”. In such manner the will to truth bases itself upon real truth. But then, this will to truth takes two different forms depending on the possible option chosen. If it opts for the first, we have the will to truth of ideas. If it opts for the second, we have the will to real truth. This is precisely what {249} we were searching for. Truth makes the will to truth necessary and makes the will for real truth possible. Man, in fact, can very easely drift into the option of the will to ideas. More difficult and less brilliant is to hold sternly to the will to things. For this reason it is urgent we reclaim it vigorously.

The will to real truth seeks more presence of reality in man. Because of this the will to real truth is the precise condition for the achievement of real truths, if not of the elemental or simple ones, at least of those founded upon them. Real truth, as I said, is certainly a characteristic of reality qua actualized in intelligence. But the nature of this actualization makes the will for truth inexorable. Now, qua terminus of the will to truth, the possession of real truth involves essentially not only the presence of the real, but eo ipso also the realization of my possibilities. It is, in fact, an option for the possibility of real truth as different from the possibility of mere ideas. And like every volition, this option among possibilities is an appropriation on my part, i.e., involves my own being. How does it do so? Not indeed because real truth consists or is founded upon my own being; rather, it is my being, which is founded upon this truth. The will to real truth is not a question of authenticity; on the contrary, that will opts because it is real truth, which configures my being. The will to real truth involves my being not as an authentic expression of it, but configuring it by appropriation of the possibilities, which real truth offers. In its apparent simplicity, real truth is filled with immense possibilities not only with respect to intellection {250} of things, but with respect to realizations of my own being. In his will to real truth, man therefore appropriates the possibility for truth, which reality offers, and surrenders to this truth, i.e., makes with it the figure of his own reality. In the surrender to real truth there occurs “at one and the same time” the presence of reality, and the realization of my own being in surrender to that truth. The will to real truth is thus the radical unity of the intellective process in actu exercito.

This unity has several characteristics, because the possibilities, which real truth offers are in turn different dependent upon the type of reality. I do not refer, of course, to the fact that man may take different attitudes when confronting the same reality, depending upon his own interests, but to something prior, to the ways in which reality presents itself to me. These ways are all different. And this means that the radical unity of the intellectual process is also differentiated in the will to real truth.

If reality is present as reality-object, its real truth is certainly the actualization of what its reality is in and by itself. But its mode of actualization is most precise, consisting in the actualization of reality in and by itself, and nothing but this in and by itself. However, that “nothing but” is not merely a negative moment. It is something eminently positive: the very definition of a possibility of mine, that of going to reality only for the sake of reality. The will to real truth is in this case will to reality, searching for reality itself. The appropriation of this possibility is the surrender to reality for the sake of reality. This “for the sake of ” is what specifies my possibility and my option when confronting a reality-object. The option for real truth is now {251} an option in which I only wish to be the natural place, so to speak, of the truth of reality. It is, among other things, the birth of science (in the widest sense of the term). Scientific knowledge, of whatever type, owes its existence to the will to real truth. It is a free option: I might have opted to surrender to reality not for the sake of reality, but for its utilization, application, etc. (we are not concerned with terminology now) of realities. Let us call this the will to the elaboration of reality. It follows that in the will to real truth, when dealing with a reality-object, what is present as act is the intrinsic and radical unity of intellection, plus an option of my being: it is “at one and the same time” presence of reality-object, and the realization of a mode of my being, i.e., my being as surrendered to reality for the sake of reality. This unity is that specific form of will to real truth expressed in “for the sake of”: the surrender to reality for the sake of reality. Here is the will to real truth when that which is present is the reality-object.

But when reality is present as reality-fundament we find ourselves in a different situation. Certainly its reality is also reality in and by itself, because if it were not it would not be a fundament. But its mode of actualization in intelligence is very different from that of a reality-object. In a reality-object its reality is present in and by itself, and “nothing but”. However, just the opposite occurs here, because the mode of actualization is “fundamentality”, specifically, my fundamentality. Therefore, I am myself a moment of that actuality. The reality-fundament is reality in and by itself but “for my sake”. It is not the case that besides being real the reality fundament may be something else that could be used to serve my interests, necessities, or conveniences. Rather, the mode of presence {252} itself of this reality qua reality is to be such fundamentingly; the mode of presence itself of this reality is “presence-for my sake”. What is this my? Any act of mine certainly constitutes a characteristic of my being. And in this sense any act constitutes velis nolis the determination of a characteristic of mine, of a characteristic of my being. But in the actualization of the reality-fundament we are not dealing with making a characteristic of my being possible, however important it may be, but with making possible the constitution of my entire being qua my being. The “my” of “for-my-sake” is my entire being as such, my I. And this being is what constitutes a moment of the actualization of reality-fundament in my intelligence. Now, the actuality of the real in intelligence is precisely real truth. And this is also intrinsically valid for the founded real truths. It follows that in this “for-my-sake” of a reality-fundament we have “at one and the same time” the real truth of reality and the real truth of my person, my real truth. This truth has, as we pointed out before, three dimensions, which in the case of personal reality are manifestation, fidelity, and unquestionable facticity. And it is in accordance with these three dimensions that the fundamentality of reality-fundament is present to me: it is fundamentality with regards to manifestation, fidelity and unquestionable facticity.

By virtue of this, actualization along the lines of “fundamentality” constitutes a radical actualization for my possibility. It is not the possibility of reality for the sake of reality, as in the case of reality-object, but the possibility of reality “for my sake” of real truth. This is the possibility of being my own being, but of being so, foundedly or foundationally. The actualization of the reality-fundament is “at one and the same time” presence of fundamental reality and possibility of radical realization of my own being {253} in truth: I proceed towards reality “for my sake”. And this “for” is what specifies this new possibility.

What is the characteristic of this possibility? A possibility is so only if it is one possibility among others. What are these others? That is the question. As we already pointed out, the actualization of the reality-fundament is actualization not only of reality-fundament, but at one and the same time, actualization of reality-fundament. In other words, under one aspect it is knowledge, i.e., terminus of allowing that its reality be what it may be in and of itself; but under another aspect is terminus of allowing that this reality occur in me fundamenting me qua reality. From this I obtain a double possibility for myself. One is the possibility of making it fundament me within myself; another, the possibility to leave this fundamentation in suspense. In such case the reality-fundament is still known in its reality, but ceases to be fundamenting, i.e., remains reduced eo ipso to a mere reality-object. It is not the case that it has presented itself as a reality-object, but that it remains, by suspension of its fundamenting characteristic, reduced to a reality-object. A reality-fundament can be turned into a reality-object, but only by reduction. These are the two possibilities. This is different from the case of the reality-object, where we found the possibility of real truth on one side and on the other the possibility of elaboration of reality; now we have, within real truth, the possibility of reality-fundament on one side, and on the other the possibility of reduction to a mere reality-object. These are the two possibilities inscribed in the real truth of a reality-fundament.

Man has to choose between them. But before we delve into this choice, let us review at least very briefly the conceptual scheme {254} we have just presented to avoid loosing our way. Intellection is formally the actualization of something in its naked reality. Qua actualization, this is its real truth. Reality is actualized in many ways; one of them, especially important for our problem, is the actualization of reality “as towards”. This form of reality hurls us towards an ambit of reality, an ambit, above all, of possible termini, which have different characteristics. Here we are concerned with two: reality-object and reality-fundament. Naked reality then, opens before us the ambit of these two types of reality. But this ambit is not only of possible termini, but is “at one and the same time” of my possibilities, because the termini have to be determined by me, and therefore their determination is eo ipso a possibility of realizing myself in one form or another. Among these possibilities man has to choose in order to appropriate them, i.e., he must carry out a volition. And inasmuch as this volition falls upon a reality “as towards” it is a will to truth, to a truth, which is not the elemental real truth of first intellection, but the will to founded truth. Real truth takes one inexorably to the will to founded truth. This will chooses between two possibilities: the possibility to ideate reality (will to truth of ideas), and the possibility to increment the presence of reality in man (will to founded real truth). This last will in turn opens new possibilities depending upon the type of terminus upon which it falls. If it concerns a reality-object there are two possibilities of the will to real truth. One, to proceed towards reality to “do” something with it. Another, to proceed towards reality “for the sake” of reality. Both possibilities are founded upon the will to real truth. If it is the case of reality-fundament there are two other possibilities. One, {255} limiting myself to knowing its reality, i.e., reducing it to reality-object; another, let it be fundamenting me, i.e., for me to proceed towards reality as “for-my-sake”.

As I said, man has to choose for one of these two ultimate possibilities. Man can choose fundamentality itself, i.e., the possibility that the fundamentality of reality-fundament happen in my being as such. What is this happening? When surrendering to reality “for my sake”, the “my”, i.e., my whole being, acquires eo ipso the figure of reality-fundament, because my being has appropriated it, has made it its own, i.e., lives in the figure of its fundament. Therefore, to happen is here to allow the reality-for-me to be formally the “my” for which it is the fundament; it is the actuality of fundamentality in me. The real truth of my person, in its three dimensions of manifestation, fidelity, and unquestionable facticity, is configured on the real truth of reality-fundament: my manifestation as a relatively absolute being is the manifestation of the absolute of fundament, my fidelity is fidelity in the absolute, my facticity is the unquestionable facticity in the absolute. Then the will for real truth is will to fundamentality. This is what we were searching for. My being is thus being in truth, something quite different than being truly. “Truly” actually expresses authenticity. On the other hand, “to be in truth” expresses that my entire being is such in and by the truth of a reality “for my sake”. To surrender to reality-fundament as such is to surrender to my own fundamentality, to make my own its fundamentality. This is to make that fundamentality pass to the formally and expressly desired structure of my own life, to make me live fundamentally.

{256} Man carries out this option more or less freely, but always with freedom. He could have opted for the other possibility, that of suspending the fundamentality of reality-fundament. Under the latter option, it is not the case that I have placed myself in a different way with respect to the same reality as before; despite appearances, what has occurred is to change the characteristic of the mode of presence of the thing. The latter continues being the same materially, so to speak, but formally its type of reality has changed: it is no longer fundament, but object. And this is the essence of the matter: one has made the reality-fundament into something else, a reality-object. Then my surrender to it is a surrender to the reality of that object for the sake of its reality itself; but it is no longer reality for me. This does not mean that knowledge of that reality, or its cognitive value, is annulled. On the contrary, such knowledge is preserved. What it means is that “at one and the same time” with the objectification of the reality-fundament, man remains eo ipso distanced from it. This distance is, actually, the very definition of something being ob-jectum, ob-ject. By virtue of this, man has become a mere natural place for his own truth. I do not surrender to my fundament now, but find myself distanced from it. To distance myself from my fundament is simply to reduce it to the condition of object. That is the reason for that paradoxical situation in which man knows the reality-fundament perfectly, but yet does not surrender to it. The fact is that man reduces fundamentality to mere objectuality. This reduction is a possibility, which man has chosen freely. It is commonly thought that in order to surrender to the fundament man has to choose, but not to surrender himself, as if reality began {257} by presenting itself as object and only afterwards was discovered to be fundament. No, reality-fundament presents itself a limine as reality-fundament. In the case of reality-fundament, the choice for objectuality, i.e., the reduction to reality-object, is not less optional or less free than the surrender to fundamentality itself.

In the will to fundamentality man wishes to know, surrendering himself to fundamentality of the known, in order to let the known be what it is (i.e., fundament), and to let me be what I am (i.e., a being founded on it). This is, therefore, the radical unity of the intellective process, and my being as such. My intellection, and my freedom of choice are not only not incompatible, but have an intrinsic unity: this is the will to fundamentality.

What is its nature? The will to fundamentality is not merely an act following upon the intellection of reality-fundament; it is a will that starts the intellective process (to discover the possibilities of the “towards”), and what makes the intellectively known into the real, actual fundament of my substantive absolute being, in which my life consists. This will is, therefore, as any will to truth, a will antecedent in some measure to the truth known intellectively. This “antecedence” does not consist in being act. Were that the case, it could be thought that it is a will that exerts pressure so that the known may appear to me as that which I beforehand wish it to be. Neither as consequent to knowledge nor as antecedent to it is the will to fundamentality an act of the will. Primarily and radically the will to fundamentality, as any will to truth, is not act. It is more than mere capacity, but is less than {258} act: it is attitude. It is the attitude of surrendering my own being to that which may show itself intellectively to be its fundament. The will to fundamentality is principle of attitude.

With these quite summary concepts, but sufficient for our purpose, we can confront the problem of the radical unity of knowledge of God and faith in Him.