{268} (cont’d)

a) Above all else, there is the undeniable fact that the validity of the rational proofs for the existence of God, presented throughout history has not been admitted by everyone not even by all those who admit, or are willing to admit, the reality of God. This should disclose the inanity of the will to truth in what refers to the knowledge of God. The first moment of the will to truth, i.e., that this will leads to the knowledge of God, would seem to be “refuted” in vivo so to speak. But here there is a great equivocation which we need to resolve. Proof of the existence of God, i.e., intellectual demonstration, even when put in motion by the will to truth, has a scope and a value which do not depend on the will, but exclusively on the intelligence itself. Discussion about the validity of the proofs is a matter of intellection and nothing else. Following this line of reasoning, I have proposed a proof on Chapter Three of this book. I consider it rigorously conclusive (if not, I would not have proposed it), but together with the other proofs it is subject to argument. But, Is this to what we refer when we say that the will unlocks, and puts in motion the intellective process of the knowledge of God? That the will to truth, as will to fundamentality, may set in motion the intellective process is something that belongs intrinsically, and indisputably to that will. What has not been mentioned is that an intellective process is identical to a demonstration. This is the mistake that must be dispelled. Demonstration is only a mode, though the most strict and stringent of intellection. But it is not identical to an intellective process; rather {269} such a process is anterior, including chronologically, to any possible demonstration. Demonstration is the most rigorous form this process can acquire. Because of this, discussion about the rigor of the argumentation does not affect the existence of the intellective process; such discussion always arises from within that process. Whence, it follows that in the intellective process two things must be considered. One, that which intelligence manages to know intellectively through a process; another, that moment according to which the intellective process is anchored in the will to truth. The “demonstration” only concerns the first point, but does not touch the second, which is the prior and radical one. The multiplicity and possible lack of satisfaction of the proofs in no way “refute” the fact that there is a will to truth to which an intellective process essentially pertains.

Nonetheless, this does not exhaust the “real” question, because while distinct, these two points are not absolutely independent. What, in fact, is this process? My person, insofar as it has to construct its relatively absolute being acquired in religation to the power of the real, is, as we saw, in need of a fundament because the power of the real is intrinsically problematic. This is not a speculative problem, but a “real” problem qua problem, the problem of personal life. In this problematism, in fact, we are not directed towards an object that may be terminus of a theoretical consideration; rather, in all our acts we are physically hurled “towards”, i.e., towards the ambit of fundamentality. And in this opening “towards”, intelligence itself is included. Wherefore, intellection has two aspects. Primarily, in this “hurling” it sketches out what fundamentality is. We saw this at the beginning of the {270} third chapter: the idea of God Himself qua idea. But, in the second place, that ambit is something more: an ambit as a moment of the reality of the power of the real. And under this aspect we here have something more than an idea; we have, so to speak, the perimeter, which outlines an area of reality, that area called “fundamentality”. It is nothing more than the perimeter of an ambit, but it is a real perimeter of reality; it is, therefore, a moment of reality. This is not a question of argumentation: it is the very structure of my I in reality, to the power of which we are religated. And this structure is formally intellective; it is the intellection of something real, of the ambit of the fundamentality of the real. Naturally, as I just said, it is nothing more than a real ambit in reality, which is most imprecise. But this imprecision is not the imprecision of an idea, but the indetermination of a real ambit. Whence, the will to fundamentality moves intelligence in order to determine this ambit more precisely; this is just what the intellective process is. Therefore, an intellective process essentially belongs to the will to fundamentality, which makes that a moment of the reality that is realizing itself processually be intellectually known.

This process is a process of intelligence in the reality, in that mode of it, which is “reality as towards”. Because the ambit of fundamentality, as I just mentioned, is not a mere idea, but a moment of reality itself. Because of this, its intellection is always an intellection of something real; real “as towards”, but still real. And this is essential, because inside this real ambit in reality, the intellective process can adopt the figure of a conclusive argument; this is the proof or demonstration that this real ambit is constituted by an absolutely {271} absolute reality. The demonstration of that reality is not just a mere transition from idea to reality, but the discovery of the very structure of the real qua “as towards” real, of that reality in which we already are and which we already know intellectually. Any demonstration of the existence of God is thus an intellective process from within reality itself.

However, not every intellective process is demonstrative. And this is so for several reasons. In the first place, the validity of the proofs is always debatable; on the other hand, from the point of view of a will to fundamentality, the intellective process of an ambit of the real is a fact however much in need of clarification, but a fact nevertheless. In the second place, it might happen that a particular person is unable to arrive at a proof that is self-convincing. Nonetheless, an intellection of something real, i.e., of the ambit, always exists. And in third place, and most importantly, the intellective process can lead to something quite different than a demonstration.

In fact, a man can more or less spontaneously lodge (so to speak) the absolutely absolute reality of God in the ambit of the real we are considering. If for such a man there were no “demonstration”, this admission of the reality of God would not be intellectively justified; but it would be an authentic faith. Then there is an intellection, a gnosis (in the etymological sense of the term, and not as a designation of gnosticism in the history of religions). This is the intellection of the real ambit of the fundamentality of the real, but an intellection, which does not yield strict knowledge, but faith. Such is, definitely, the case of nearly all men who believe in God: they do not try to {272} prove or rationally justify the reality of God to themselves. To discover God does not mean to demonstrate His existence. Conversely, to demonstrate the existence of God does not mean that reasoning is “the” way to discover God. Demonstration of the existence of God is not primarily a logical exigency, which is waved only in front of those who do not believe in God, but a logical exigency addressed equally to the believers, an exigency, which demands from the latter a strict justification of that in which they believe.

Nonetheless, faith is only one possible terminus of the intellective process without any type of demonstration of God’s existence. It is also possible that man may not only not reach a proof, but moreover that he may even suspend belief. In such case there is, strictly speaking, no gnosis, but agnosía; this is agnosticism. Even though it may seem like a paradox, agnosticism is an intellective process; the agnostic intellective process. What is, actually, agnosticism? It consists, of course, in placing oneself in the ignorance of the reality of God: “I do not know if God exists”. But insofar as it is ignorance, agnosticism is eo ipso a mode of the intellective process, because ignorance is not just mere lack of a knowing. Every ignorance, on the contrary, is always ignorance of something quite precise. In other words, the one who ignores knows in one form or another what it is that he ignores. The man of Altamira¹ was not ignorant of what a differential equation is, because he lacked any reference to such equations. Only the man who is told about differential equations, and does not know what we are talking about because he does not understand the meaning of the words, only this man is ignorant of what a differential equation is. The mere expression “differential equation” means, by the fact of being a mention of something, what it is that is ignored: “that” (the differential equation) is ignored. Without the “that” there is no ignorance, but merely a lack.

{273} Ignorance is, therefore, a mode of the intellective process. And so, agnosticism is not lack of information, but ignorance, in which, therefore, one knows what it is that one ignores. Yet agnosticism is more than that. It is not mere ignorance, but ignorance of something, which is ignored because it has not been intellectively found. Only this type of ignorance is the one proper to the agnostic: the ignorance of what has not been found. Where has it not been found? In reality. But in reality not like that in which our ideas are realized, but like that, which being a moment of the real, appears indeterminate to me. The ambit of fundamentality is a moment of reality. Therefore, although not known specifically as being God, God is indeed a real moment. He is known intellectively as really a being that, though we do not yet know what it is in reality, the agnostic knows intellectively He is real in a mode not yet well known. Therefore, agnosticism is not fully alien either to the reality of God or His intellection. It is rather alien to the strict knowledge of God. With respect to God or to any other reality, to know it intellectively, i.e., to apprehend it as real, is not the same, by any stretch of the imagination, as to know it. To hear a sound is not to know what the sound is. Hence, the ignorance of the agnostic is not lack of knowledge of God, but an intellection more or less specific of Him, i.e., with no strict knowledge. This is the unknowability of God, quite a different thing than His non-intellection. But agnosticism is still something else. It is not only ignorance and unknowability, but the ignorance and unknowability of something, which the agnostic searches for diligently, but does not find. He searches for God, because God, although unknown, is something in which the agnostic lives as it were touching his {274} naked reality. The ambit of fundamentality, I repeat, is a moment of reality. And this real moment is not alien in its reality to the reality of man himself. It is an absolute moment that, as such, the agnostic like any other man not only knows intellectively, but “touches”. It is a probing, which however does not yet reach the precise figure of the eidos of the moment of reality —let us state it thus. And in this sense it is probing without a precise encounter. From this point of view, agnosticism is a frustrated intellective search. It is in this frustration where unknowability, and ignorance of God take on their figure, where the suspension of faith occurs. But as ignorance, as unknowability, and as frustration, agnosticism is a strict form of intellective process, which rests upon a real moment of reality known intellectively as such.

Both faith, which is intellectively insufficient, and agnosticism, shed a positive light on the essential nature of one aspect of the will to fundamentality. A strictly intellective process formally and essentially pertains to this will. Inasmuch as this process is not identified with a proof, i.e., with a rational justification for the existence of God, it follows that this first fact of the three we are studying discloses that the will to fundamentality is essentially a will to search. And it is in this will, in a variety of ways as we have just seen, that intellection and choice are radically “united”, because the very suspension of faith of the agnostic is a positive mode of choice. The will to fundamentality is, therefore, not only that in which knowledge and faith are rooted, but also that which unfolds itself into intellective search and option.

{275} But not every man is a searcher after God. This takes us to the other moment of the will to fundamentality, to the choice itself. It is there that the other two facts we must now consider are inscribed.

b) Firstly, there is the fact that a very large number of people live completely unconcerned about the question with which we are wrestling. We pointed out above that man finds himself inexorably forced to proceed “towards” the reality of God, choosing, also inexorably, between God as reality-object and God as reality-fundament. However, it is an undeniable fact that many men are unconcerned with any choice. Therefore, they are neither involved in an intellective process towards God nor do they make any choice with respect to Him. And since these two moments are the ones that constitute the will to fundamentality, these lives heedless of the problem of their fundament, are eo ipso lives without any will to fundamentality.

We are not trying to underestimate this attitude. Just the opposite. To be unconcerned with the problem of the fundament of life is not synonymous with frivolity. To be sure, it can be and in many cases it is frivolity; but frivolity has nothing to do with what, in itself, is the attitude of the man who is unconcerned with the problem of his fundament, especially since frivolity may affect everything, including the admission of the reality of God. We are concerned here, therefore, with an absolutely serious attitude. We shall soon see how it differs from frivolity.

And indeed, it is precisely when taken with full seriousness that this attitude displays its own nature to us. What, in fact, is it to be unconcerned? Let us consider what this attitude is with respect to the intellective {276} process. Here we encounter again, although in a different dimension, the same situation we examined concerning the rational proof for the existence of God. As the intellective process is put into action, intelligence encounters two types of reality, reality-object and reality-fundament, and therefore two conceptualizations of God: otiose God and founding God. And the proof, by means of the way, which in fact is religation, has taken us to God as founding reality. And, I repeat, this aspect of the conceptualization of the reality of God is an exclusive matter of intelligence itself; something, therefore, completely alien to any possible will. But, as we have already mentioned, “intellective process” is not synonymous with “demonstrative process”. Man, actually, is hurled intellectively “towards” the fundamentality of his life, religated to the power of the real. And then, as we have also shown, in this hurling man encounters not only the outline of the idea of God, but also the ambit of fundamentality as a moment of reality itself. This is an intellective process. Now, it is within this process that the intelligence takes a decisive step: it examines the nature of this ambit as a moment of reality and discovers the polar difference between reality-object and reality-fundament. It is precisely at this point when the intelligence demonstrates that this ambit is real only because of a reality-fundament. But the reverse is not true: even though intelligence were not to discover it as such, there will always be an intellective process inexorably unlocked by virtue of being hurled, also inexorably, “towards” fundamentality. In what then would this process consist? It would be really and truly the intellective process of a moment of reality, but a process, which does not arrive at that difference: {277} this would be in-different intellection. Then it is not the case there is no intellective process, but rather that there is an intellective process, which arrives at in-difference. Here we have, with respect to the intellective process, the essence of the attitude, which is unconcerned about the reality of God. The one who is unconcerned is indifferent towards an otiose God or towards a founding God. We shall soon refine the sense of this phrase, which in itself is not formally rigorous. It is a suspension of conclusion. The agnostic suspends faith; he who is indifferent suspends the intellective conclusion. He does not even question whether he knows the existence of God, nor what He might be if He were to exist; his attitude across the board is “Let God be as He may”; I am not concerned. In this “be as He may” we have the very essence of what I have called “suspension of the intellective process”. This suspension is not a cessation of intellection, but a strict intellection of what fundamentality is as moment-type ambit of reality: it would be something really indifferent. This indifference has many shadings, from admitting the reality of God known intellectively, but indifferently, to the opposite extreme, a certain indifference with respect to the reality of God Himself, passing through the idea of divine otiosity. At this point I must correct the expression I employed before: it is not exactly the case that he who is indifferent may admit that God is an otiose God, but that it is otiose to be concerned about God...“whatever He may be”, i.e., be God otiose or not. The ambit of fundamentality is always known intellectively as “whatever He may be” (sea lo que fuere). But since this ambit is a moment of reality, the “being” (el “ser“) of whatever “He may be” (de lo “que fuere“) always involves the undifferentiated reality of God: this is the undifferentiated intellection of a moment of His fundamentality. Consequently, {278} despite appearances, whoever is unconcerned with the reality of God, has in his attitude a strict intellective process, which knows God intellectively as “whatever He may be”. Indifference is a mode of intellective process different from demonstration. What occurs is that intellective demonstration is eo ipso the radical overcoming of any possible indifference: God is reality-fundament.

Nevertheless, this does not exhaust the attitude of one who is unconcerned about the reality of God. Because in this attitude not only is the intellective process suspended by reason of indifference, but at the same time one lives unconcerned about the reality of God. Intellective in-difference is “at one and the same time” un-concernedness. On this basis it would seem that one who ignores these matters lives without making any choice regarding God. And yet, this is but an appearance. Just as indifference is not lack of intellective process, so unconcernedness is not absence of choice. Unconcernedness is not no-choice. Anyone who ignores, I said, knows in some measure that which he ignores. Similarly, one who is unconcerned senses that behind his lack of concern there throbs the mute presence of what he is unconcerned about; therefore, he is subliminally directed towards it. Because of this, unconcernedness is a positive state; it is not no-choice, but strict choice, the choice of not being concerned about that which “is there” indifferently. Therefore, one chooses for in-difference: this is the moment of the “un”. The one who ignores concerns himself unconcernedly about what he knows intellectively as indifferent. Whoever disregards the problem of the reality of God has, therefore, not only intellective process, but also choice. The ambit of fundamentality is known intellectively as in-different, and man by choice appropriates the possibility of living in fundamental indifference: this is unconcernedness. To {279} intellective in-difference there corresponds the un-concernedness, which has been chosen: the “un” life is life in “in”.

In-difference and un-concernedness, in their intrinsic and radical unity are, therefore, the two moments of a unique attitude, a very precise attitude with respect to the fundamentality of life. Even to disregard the problem of fundamentality, the problem of God, is therefore, a will to fundamentality. And in its apparent negativity, this attitude reveals something essential for us in the will to fundamentality, because man does not disregard God as he might disregard a scientific or speculative problem or perform a task, such as undertaking a voyage, i.e., due to an absence of curiosity or capacity. The turning “towards” fundamentality is, actually, something inexorable. Consequently, to disregard it is a positive way of living. And as a way of life it has two aspects. On the one hand, unconcerned with God, i.e., with the fundamentality of life, one lives abandoned to “whatever” might happen. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not the case that one may live without fundamentality, but that one may live in a fundamental indifference, which is a different matter. This living in founding indifference is precisely what we call “let live”, i.e., to allow oneself to be fundamented. And here we find the difference between disregarding God and frivolity. Frivolity is lack of seriousness. On the other hand, whoever disregards God lives seriously based on his fundament, even though it may be conceptualized as in-different. The indifference of let live is anything but frivolity; it is a mode of fundamentality. Therefore, the will to let live is a will to fundamentality. It is a kind of indifferent surrender to the fundamentality of life, a non-blind faith, but one which is indifferent and unconcerned. Yet on the other hand, there is something {280} in a way more decisive in this attitude, because it is certainly a let live, but a “let” only with respect to its fundament. In itself this attitude is a resolute will to live. One who is unconcerned lives and lets live because above and beyond his fundamental indifference, what he does is to affirm forcefully that he lives and wants to live. His disregard of the problem of God is taken for the sake of life. He opts for being un-concerned with a God whom he knows intellectively as in-different, precisely because of his will to live: he wants the indifference of fundamental reality not to be an impediment to life.

The two aspects of this attitude, to let live and the will to live, taken unitarily, define one unique will: a will to live we might call “penultimate”: the penultimateness of life. It is a will to live, but allowing oneself to be borne along wherever by the fundament. One who is unconcerned with God lives superficially: it is a constitutively penultimate life. And that manifests its principal limitation: this will to fundamentality does not go beyond in-difference. But it also manifests something essential: that the will to fundamentality is not a will to truth in some theoretical way, but is, constitutively, the will to live. And it is this will, which unfolds into intellective process and option. Though limited and penultimate in this attitude, still, intellective process and option are a fundamental unfolding of the will to live.

But not every man seems to possess this will to fundamentality, because for many of them their will to live is not even penultimate: it reposes upon itself qua will to live. This is the third of the three important facts we are addressing.
_________________
¹ [Tr. note: reference to Prehistoric man (c. 14,000-c. 9,500 B.C.) who left cave-paintings near Altamira in Northern Spain.]