{306} (cont’d)

B) Reason “returning to itself”.
Spirit (from finite spirit to absolute spirit).

What does Hegel understand by spirit? First of all, it is to be there in itself (bei sich selbst sein). This is what Hegel calls “freedom”, freedom in the sense of possessing itself {307} and being there within itself. The fact that finite spirit may emerge is strictly a problem of mediation; in other words, this freedom in which spirit exists is not something that is there next to nature, but something that exists precisely by nature itself. Not in the sense that spirit may be a product of nature, but in the sense that nature is the mediation whereby spirit may be able to exist. Spirit exists primarily as liberation and as liberation from nature, from exteriority, and with it the entry into itself as interiority immediately appears. Freedom is mediated there by nature and the entry of spirit into itself, insofar as entry, is also mediated there by nature. But it is necessary for Hegel to tell us with some degree of precision what is this he so vaguely calls spirit.

Hegel says the evolution of spirit is given in three stages.
I. In the form of a relationship with itself, which is called subjective spirit.
II. In the form of reality, which spirit has in the world, and therefore, something different and superior to subjective spirit; it is objective spirit.
III. In the identity in and by itself of the spirit that has accomplished entering into itself and eternally exists with itself; this is absolute spirit¹.
For the moment let us put aside absolute spirit and ask about the finite spirit, which is both subjective spirit and objective spirit. What type of entity do they have for Hegel?

Shall be quite brief about subjective spirit since what we mentioned above concerning the Phenomenology of Spirit is the answer to the idea of subjective spirit. Hegel tells us that subjective spirit begins to emerge in the bosom of nature as liberation from it. It is what is {308} called “soul” (Seele). This soul is characterized because in its supreme function it is aware of what is not itself, its own reality and the reality of things appear in what we call “conscience” (Bewusstsein). That is what subjective spirit is.

But the great creation of Hegel is objective spirit, with respect to which we have to ask three things. In the first place, what is it? In the second place, what is its internal and structural dialectic? And in third place, what is its relationship with subjective spirit?

In the first place, what is objective spirit? Hegel will never say that that objective spirit is a kind of social conscience or public conscience, not at all, “conscience” is something only individuals have. Objective spirit is not a form of conscience, but has a much greater reality, it has objective reality. But conscience is the domain of the subjective and it is not the case that in objective spirit there is no conscience, but that the conscience of objective spirit belongs to each of the subjects, it does not belong to objective spirit itself. There is a conscience of objective spirit, but it belongs to each of the individuals that comprise it or are in it. Certainly, objective spirit is not independent from these individuals, not because of conscience, but for several different reasons, because of all its other dimensions. This means —Hegel affirms this specifically— that the individuals are the support of objective spirit. But objective spirit is not determined by the complexity of the individuals that comprise it, but just the opposite. Objective spirit, Hegel tells us, is the absolute idea; in other words, it is an idea to which has been subtracted, in some way, the moment of “for itself”. Absolute spirit is in itself and for itself; then, think that absolute spirit has not yet entered its dimension {309} of “for itself”, and is only existing with the “in itself”; the manifestation of this situation is the objective spirit. Objective spirit is not outside the individuals, but still it does not emerge from them, rather they dialectically make that what the objective spirit is may appear ad extra. Consequently, the individuals that comprise objective spirit as its support are merely the accidents of objective spirit, which is the substantial.

This may sound terrible, but it is the pivot of the whole philosophy of spirit of Hegel. Individuals are the accidents of objective spirit. It is true that great historical individualities exist, but these individualities are great and belong to history inasmuch as they incarnate the objective spirit, not inasmuch as they are provided with personal greatness.

Objective spirit thus understood is purely and simply the manifestation —if you will, by alienation and mediation— of the absolute spirit in which God consists. It is the universal spirit (Weltgeist). Objective spirit is the objective concept God has of himself. Inasmuch as that universal spirit suffers different geographic and temporal determinations it gives place to what Hegel calls the “spirit of the people” (Volkgeist); these are determinations of objective spirit, of the universal spirit, which are different and multiple in accordance to the regions and moments of time.

In the second place, if this is objective spirit we must ask Hegel, in what does the internal dialectic of objective spirit consist? Is it the case purely and exclusively that absolute spirit may acquire an objective form in order to drop it upon individuals? That is not the dialectic of objective spirit of Hegel. Objective spirit is not the individuals, but also it is not the result of individuals. Here makes an appearance what we mentioned above referring to synthesis, that it is an originating synthesis. {310} Objective spirit, insofar as it is realized ad extra in each of the individuals, makes that the objective form of spirit may spring forth in each of them. This dialectic is the one that for Hegel formally constitutes history.

The dialectic structure of objective spirit is history. What does Hegel understand here by history (Geschichte)? Certainly, it is the temporal process of objective spirit, this is clear. But this temporal spirit, this temporal dialectic flows along three great categories.

In the first place, we have the category of “variation” (Veränderung). The objective spirit is in continuous disquietude (Unruhe); if it were in constant quiescence it would not be objective spirit, but simply dead nature.

But, in second place, that variation to which it is subject is not arbitrary. It is not simply that the forms of objective spirit, the spirit of peoples, may be of a certain type and after some time become corrupt, perfected or enriched and turn into something different. Hegel understands that if we pursue —we shall immediately see what this means— the core of the matter, this is something completely different. In all these variations the objective spirit that appears to die, is reborn from itself in a process of “rejuvenation” (Verjüngung). Hegel then asks, in what the natural death of the spirit of a people consists. His answer is summarized in two terms, its political nullity (politische Nulität). But, like the Phoenix, it is reborn from its ashes and history continues its stepping march, although it may be in another place. It is not only possible that it may continue in another place, but also Hegel explicitly says it is impossible the same people may constitute two different eras of history; if it has done it once, it will not be able to do it a second time.

{311} But, in third place, there is another category, which is the one most important for Hegel, the category of “reason” (Vernunft). Historical dialectic is reason in time; reason as he has conceived it, as conceptivizing thinking. Reason is absolute spirit that in the form of universal spirit dialectically constitutes itself, on the one hand from itself and on the other, from individuals and objective spirits. Inasmuch as this reason is for Hegel an objectivizing thinking, it is obvious that reason in history for Hegel is not a reason that “from the outside” governs the deepest ground of history. Reason, of course, “dominates” history, but it is not domination from the outside, it is a reason that is internal and intrinsic to history itself. It is reason itself converted into history, into the objective form of history. It is the case, therefore, of the internal history of reason realizing itself in time. For this concept of reason in history Hegel has made use of two very important traditions.

One is the idea of providence; there is providential reason, and Hegel learnt this from classical theology. The other is the idea of teleology. The course of human events has a final goal, is directed towards something. Hegel says it is directed towards the greater glory of God and, that in fact, this is the authentic goal of objective spirit. We shall leave that aside for now. The idea of providence and the idea of universal teleology constitute for Hegel the fountain for his reason in history. Provided we rethink these terms in a Hegelian way.

Providence is reason governing the world, which is evident from a certain point of view. But if we limit ourselves to expressing it this way, it would be subjective reason. It would be the reason God has —the “subject” called God— for having made the world and men directed to be in a certain way. This is not what Hegel intends; what he is attempting to do is to consider the {312} reason classical theology frequently designates as providence, as something that molds itself objectively. This is what is important for Hegel, the objective molding of the reason that governs the world, because in this fashion it is not a reason that governs the world, but a reason inscribed in the very bosom of the world. This reason inscribed in the very bosom of the world is its télos, by reason of which the dialectic of its history will be the way to entelécheia, which is precisely absolute spirit. Hegel takes subjective reason and objective reason at one and the same time, just as he did in logic, insofar as conceptivizing thinking. Here we have historical reason now, which is at the same time subjective reason and objective reason because it is the reason of the concept of objective spirit as set on its stepping march through time.

It will be necessary at this point for Hegel to tell us what is the formal structure of that history, of that historical dialectic. Hegel provides us with a precise answer, that this history is evolution (Entwicklung). It starts from a germinal nucleus and it consists in evolution. Of course, Hegel is not appealing here to evolution in the biological sense of the term. This was of much interest to Hegel at the time this issue began to agitate Europe, but he was more interested in something different, namely, the idea that this evolution is the work of reason. However, even though this may be the work of reason, it is an evolution, but an evolution of reason and of reason dialectically constituted. With this, ultimately, all great creations of history are for Hegel pre-included in the germ from which they dialectically emerge. In this sense, no radical innovations are ever produced in history; “In the first stirrings of spirit, all history is contained virtualiter”². Does this mean that history is the dialectic of virtuality? {313} This is an important problem we should present to Hegel. What if history is not a dialectic of virtuality, and therefore, of realities, but a system of creation and closing of possibilities? Then history would be something different, it would clearly produce possibility prior to reality, and this would make it a quasi-creation. However, we shall leave this issue aside.

Here Hegel offers a very precise idea of what he understands by history. That idea is the reality, the nucleus, and the germ, just as in nature the seed is of the tree. That is why the first stirrings of spirit already contain virtualiter the totality of history. We may then pose the question, was the whole of history virtually contained in Adam?

The third question we have to put before Hegel with respect to objective spirit is the relationship between subjective spirit and objective spirit. Hegel has no doubts in proposing two affirmations that would have shaken any reflective spirit. He affirms that when objective spirit is put into motion the subjective spirit has nothing to do; the individuals are preserved simply as memories in history, but history is not made by individuals themselves, but individuals carried by history, by the objective spirit. They are, as we mentioned above, accidents, and now we can understand the radical sense of that contingency. Hegel tells us that the whole of history could be written without mentioning one single personal name, which up to a certain point is true. But this makes us think, is it true that individuals are preserved in the objective spirit only as memories of what they were and their only reality is the contribution they provided and under the form of memory still lives in the objective spirit? Hegel would not say that individuals have nothing to do in history, but he is going to {314} give an answer that consists in making cleverness an intrinsic moment of the objective spirit; this is what Hegel calls the trickiness, the slyness of reason (Die List der Vernunft). This slyness consists in the fact that certainly history cannot be made except with individuals and by individuals, but it makes these individuals believe they are working for their own individual self-interest when in reality they are working for the objective spirit. That is what happens with the act of individual reproduction, which can be undertaken for a wide variety of subjective reasons, but in reality nature works towards a different goal, namely, the preservation of the species. This is the slyness of reason. Everything individuals may perform is subjectively quite good for them, but the trick consists in making that these apparently subjective and individual things will be useful to accomplish something that surpasses individuality; this is the course of events of the objective spirit. Individuals are preserved as memories, thanks precisely to this kind of internal trickery of reason. This excludes a limine³ the possibility that one may be able to have in his hands both the concept of objective spirit and the télos of history. Because of this, philosophy of history cannot be turned into prophecy. “The philosopher has nothing to do with prophesying. From the point of view of history its concern is about things that have occurred, and about what is occurring now at this point in time. On the other hand, philosophy is not concerned with things that have had existence in the past or with those things that at some time have reached existence, but with that which exists now and will exist eternally, with reason. This provides us with plenty to do”⁴. Be that as it may, it is a grandiose view of history. In this concept of history, nothing really passes away and everything is preserved; history concerns itself with {315} whatever “is” in the sense of absolute present. “In the idea, that which appears as something that has occurred, remains eternally as something that has not been lost. The idea is always present. The spirit is immortal”⁵.

Perhaps someone will ask, what is all this? Do we have to think that there is some kind of remembrance by which whatever individuals do is present in absolute reason? It is the case of something much more profound and radical. Let us not forget that this process is dialectic, and as it happens in all dialectics, the second term is precisely surmounted (aufgehoben) in the originative synthesis, of which the thesis and antithesis are nothing but abstractions. Because of that, in the absolute spirit the individual is preserved, but in the form of “surmounted” (aufgehoben), i.e., of having contributed in one form or another to the concrete determinations of the absolute spirit. Hence, “the spirit is the concept that the spirit has now made of itself. It is the one that rationally maintains and regulates the world, and is the result of the efforts of six thousand years, the labor of the absolute spirit in history”⁶ in order to produce that history, and from it, to enter into itself. The consciousness of this characteristic of the absolute spirit is first, the philosophy of history, and afterwards, the access to the absolute spirit itself.

The absolute spirit in Hegel is precisely the idea in itself and through itself. But now that absolute spirit is the idea whose concretion is mediated by alienation in the whole of creation. Because of this, Hegel can tell us that the philosophy of history —he is against Leibniz on this— is the authentic theodicy. Indeed, if theodicy tries to justify evil, there is no other procedure to justify it; we have to understand it. This is what theodicy is, the philosophy of history. What is the relationship between {316} this absolute spirit and each of the individuals and the objective spirit? With all these dialectic moves we keep going from one thing to another, and we lose track of the idea of unity, which however, is what matters most to Hegel. The truth is the whole.

With respect to God and each man “Inasmuch as God is present everywhere, He is present in each man, appears in the conscience of each, and this is the universal spirit”⁷. “If the essence of God were not the essence of man and of nature, it would precisely be an essence that is nothing”⁸. Clearly, this is a most emphatic affirmation of pantheism. We need to clarify this concept, and we shall do so immediately. Nevertheless, it is clear that for Hegel, since the subjective spirit consists in consciousness, to say that God is the manifestation of his own absolute spirit in the consciousness of each, amounts to saying that the consciousness of men is the consciousness that God has of himself. God is not consciousness, He is absolute reason; that this absolute reason may have a consciousness of himself is the work of men because men are the consciousness of God.

The same question, addressed to the objective spirit is going to elicit a similar response. “The process that enables the spirit to enter into itself, to his own concept, is history”⁹. The result of this stepping march is that the spirit, when objectifying itself “outside” and thinking about his own being, achieves his own concrete and internal determination. Further on Hegel says, “Universal history is the representation of the divine absolute process of the spirit in its supreme configurations, in those gradations by which it certainly acquires its own truth about {317} itself”¹⁰. This is precisely the most resounding affirmation of pantheism. However, what does “pantheism” mean here?

A pantheist would have been, for example, Spinoza. He had said Deus sive natura, that God is the only substance with two fundamental modes, that of extension and that of thought, and from that substance the entire complex of the res extensa and the res cogitans of Descartes is developed. Is that the pantheism of Hegel? Not quite, it is the case of something different because the substratum, that which constitutes the radical reality is not a substance, but is purely and simply a spirit, the absolute spirit. Hence, the absolute spirit —Hegel tells us— is pure actuosity, pure process, pure activity. Therefore, it is not the case of a pantheism that consists in being a substance that has different determinations as its properties, but it is the case of an activity. What kind of activity? A rational activity. In what does that rational activity consist? Does it consist in a purely subjective activity? Right from the beginning Hegel says it is not; it consists precisely in begreiffendes Denken, in putting into that subjective activity something objective, which however, has no other reality except by the position of subject. Inasmuch as we only consider the objective slope, the philosophy of Hegel is not pantheist. Inasmuch as we only consider the subjective slope, the philosophy of Hegel strictly speaking would also not be pantheist. It is pantheist inasmuch as we can see that the objective is precisely a rational product of subjective thinking. The pantheism of Hegel consists in that; it is the pantheism of rational activity. That rational activity is precisely God; because of this, God is fieri and that fieri of God is an autofieri. That it is “rational” is what defines {318} the idealism of Hegel. That it is the whole of reality, is what defines the pantheism of Hegel. The identity between idealism and pantheism is what the absolute is in Hegel. The whole of history is an autoconformation.

Recapitulating. In the first place, the transcendental order is the very spirit of God in his eternal essence, before the creation of nature and of the finite spirit.
In the second place, the transcendental order is the very concept as system.
In the third place, this system is fundamentally and formally dialectic.
In the fourth place, it is something prior to any particular thing.
In the fifth place, it is the dialectical conformation of each thing.
In the sixth place, the entity of each thing is the mediated conformation of the concretion of absolute spirit.
In the seventh place, the absolute spirit is autoconformation.
In the eighth place, that autoconformation consists in the dialectic autoconformation of the infinitude of reason.
In the ninth place, this is how it can be seen concretely that the beginning is the resulting end, and that is, is clearly the absolute.

The beginning is the resulting end, and in that is we find the quintessence of the Absolute, i.e., the transcendental order. In the horizon of nothingness, the absolute of Hegel, which is what he sees before his eyes, is purely and simply the autoprocess of reason, the autoconformation of reason. The way of not being nothing is to be absolute, to be conceptivizing autoconformation. That is why thirty-five years ago I wrote, “We are left with the impression that while he did not reach the point of absorbing all things into his philosophy, he nevertheless went through all of them as if they were incidents suffered by someone else. ‘He’ was what his philosophy was. And his life was the history of his philosophy. Everything else was his counter-life. {319} Nothing had a personal meaning for him, which was not acquired through being relived philosophically. The Phenomenology was and is his awakening to philosophy. And philosophy itself was the intellectual revivification of his existence as a manifestation of what he called the absolute spirit. The human side of Hegel, on the one hand so quiet and far from being philosophical, acquires on the other a philosophical rank when it is elevated to the supreme publicity of what he has conceived. And conversely, the conceptivizing thinking apprehends in the individual that Hegel was, with the force conferred upon it by the absolute essence of the spirit and intellectual sediment of the whole of history. Therefore, Hegel is in a certain sense the maturity of Europe.

Regardless of our ultimate position with respect to him, any present day initiation into philosophy has to consist, in large measure, of an 'experience', of an inquiry into the situation, which Hegel has left for us”¹¹.

The above, which I wrote thirty-five years ago, I would literally repeat today.

____________________
¹ Cf. Enzyklopädie § 385.
² Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p.39.
³ [Tr. note: a limine, from the very threshold, from the very beginning, prior to any argumentation]
⁴ Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 200.
⁵ Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 165.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Die Vernunft in der Geschichgte, p. 37.
⁸ Die Vernunft in der Geschichgte, p. 38.
⁹ Die Vernunft in der Geschichgte, p. 49.
¹⁰ Die Vernunft in der Geschichgte, p. 52.
¹¹ Naturaleza, Historia, Dios (Nature, History, God), 6th ed., (Madrid, Alianza, 1974), p. 145. [Tr. note: Please refer to http://www.zubiri.org for the Spanish and English versions of the book]