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APPENDIX

THE WILL TO HISTORICAL RELIGION¹


What are the other religions by themselves? In order to formulate this problem theologically it will be necessary to start from the universality with which Christianity, and consequently the God revealed in it, calls all men to the supernatural life, without exceptions (cf. 1 Tm 2:4). It is a universality of destination, and a universality of grace in order to eventually obtain the possession of the Christian God. Therefore, it is within this universality that we find where the problem of the diversity of religions is framed formally and theologically. What are the other religions within this vocational universality?

1) Let us recall that by the use of any of the three ways undertaken in the history of religions (the way of dispersion, the way of transcendence, and the way of immanence) man really and actually reaches the divine. Occasionally I have presented the example of the Moon: a polytheist can believe in the divinity of the Moon, granted. Yet, the divinity of the Moon has several aspects: it may signify “god in the Moon”, it may signify “god of the Moon” or also “the Moon god”. Indeed, these three moments are discerned to a lesser or greater degree in the belief of the divinity of the Moon. Nevertheless, in any monotheist religion the first two points (the god of the Moon, and god in the Moon) continue {350} to be true. Is there any doubt that God is actually present in the Moon? Whoever addresses the Moon, one way or the other, really and actually reaches the same divinity as the one proposed by monotheism. The same happens if one takes the way of immanence, and considers the entire cosmos as ruled by an intrinsic cosmic-moral Law, which confers a divine characteristic to the entire universe. There is no doubt the Moon is part of that cosmos, and consequently, for the pantheist, the polytheist also accesses the divinity really and actually. The fact is that actually the power of the deity is in things. Therefore, in one form or another, hurled through the mystery of the deity, we really and actually access things, which have this power, and in one form or another are divine. Regardless how we take up the question, man really and actually accesses the divinity by any of the ways. Hence, if this is so, it means none of the ways can be false simpliciter.

2) Naturally, one may ask, Are we specifically accessing the One Christian God, the Triune God? Unquestionably, the Christian God is reached qua Christian through all the ways. Simply because the God of Christianity, within monotheism, is not a God apart from the one of all monotheisms. Indeed, there only have been two on Earth, the Israelite monotheism, and the Islamic one. The Christian God is not numerically distinct from Yahweh or Allah. Any one of these three ways reaches, from the theological point of view, the Christian God really and actually.

3) In fact, man reaches the Christian God in a different form depending on the ways he may follow. Therefore, the problem now centers on what this diversity of forms may be with which to reach, really and actually, the Christian God. {351} That is the crucial question. The diversity of forms and ways different from the way of transcendence does not mean they are not ways leading to the real, actual, and true God; the fact is they are ways, which on their own, are “de-form” (Sp. “de-formes”)². Insofar as they lead to God, they have a conformity, i.e., they really and actually reach God (I say God in order not to repeat continuously Christian God, to whom I am referring exclusively in what follows), but reach Him in a tortuous “de-form” way. In their conformity an intrinsic deformity is inscribed. However, God wishes, without exception that every man may reach Him. With this, the difference between conformity and deformity present in the religions turns into a much greater and serious problem: In what does the very structure of the will of God consist, who really and actually wishes that men have access to Him?

Theologians have usually distinguished two different types of volition in God. In the first place a volition they call to approval, referred to the thing God wishes because in itself it is a good thing. In the second place, a will purely permissive, referred to things, which are not good, but permitted by God to exist. In our case, the will to approval would be a will to conformity, and the permissive will would be the will with which He permits deformity. However, the problem does not end here because this difference only concerns the terminus. It refers to the kind of thing, which occurs in reality. However, from the point of view of God it is just one selfsame will. It may have two different terminal formalities, but it is intrinsically one. The permissive will and the will to approval are not two {352} different wills, it is one single will, intrinsically one³. Then, one asks, In what does the intrinsic oneness of the will to approval, and the permissible will consist?

a) From the point of view of God himself, His permissive will is in one form or another anchored in a will to approval. God not only has a will to approval for some things, but in a certain way —quite real and strict— has the approval of permission. He wishes, with the approving will, to have a permissible will. Permissible will, from the part of God is in His one single will, is anchored in a superior will to approval.

b) Then, one may ask, In what does this superior will to approval consist, which is terminally regarded as approval for some things considered good, and as permission for others considered bad. This intrinsic will is what I would call will to historical reality. And precisely because it is a will to historical reality, it inexorably involves a dimension of approval and a dimension of permissiveness.

However, in our problem it is not only a will to mere historical reality, in genere, but specifically a will to historical religion. The will {353} to permissiveness and the will to approval are anchored, and constitute two aspects —sit venia verbo— of one single volition: the volition and will to historical religion. The will that men may reach God historically.

4) At this point, we should now formulate the question: Upon what does the will to historical religion fall upon? Obviously it falls upon the One and Triune God, through the grace given to reach Him. As I have just said, approval and permission, are two moments of a single will such as the will to historical religion. It follows that when we refer to permissive will the object permitted is not “another” religion, but the “moment of deformity” existing in another religion. But not the other religion simpliciter and nothing else. It is a will to historical religion in which there is a dimension of approval and a dimension of conformity, but inside each religion. It is not the case other religions are permitted by God, but that what is permitted is precisely what we have called the deformity that may exist in religions. The volition to historical religion is not formally permissive volition to approval and conformity, or permissive volition to deformity, it is —sit venia verbo— will to “form-ness”. And precisely, the “form-ness” of each form is the historical body of each religion.

Every form of non-Christian religion, every historical body involves, at one and the same time, a conformity and a deformity in the supernatural vocation. Certainly, this vocation falls squarely upon the objective body of religion, and therefore, every religion, qua religion, and as objective body really and actually leads to the One and Triune God, and involves the graces necessary to reach Him. The will to historical religion is will to form-ness; will to form {354} an objective body. Hence, in this sense, the will to historical religion is above all a will to incorporation, which involves, I repeat, a moment of approval and a moment of permission, in such a way that in the body, despite its deformities, possessing a conformity, the One and Triune God is really and actually reached. The universality of the will to historical religion is not then only individual, but rather God has deposited in the objective body of each religion the necessary and sufficient graces to be able to access Him really and actually, as the One and Triune God. God is always revealed in his positive universality towards Christ. For this reason, all historical forms are universal towards Christ, and all have salvific graces anchored in Christ⁴. Therefore, the objective body of religion of all existing religions really and actually leads to the One and Triune God, and contains the grace to reach Him. From this follows that the individual does not save himself notwithstanding the religion he has, but in and by the religion he professes, whichever it may be. This is the intrinsic oneness —I repeat once more— between the will to approval and the will to permission in the will to historical religion, i.e., in the will to form-ness. In this sense, as a contemporary theologian says, every religion is legitimate⁵. However, it was necessary to have arrived at this conclusion through a strictly theological and metaphysical consideration. Supernatural religion {355} is, in the end, something, which is deposited in the objective body of religions, regardless of all the deformities it may contain.

5) Obviously, to say that all religions are legitimate does not mean that everything in them assumes the approval. I have just pointed this out: there are also deformities. The concept of legitimacy is not even remotely identified with the concept of truth and conformity. Deformity is not alien to the religions outside Christianity, not even to the religion of Israel. How can we doubt —considering the evangelical testimony— that many moments of the religion of Israel have simply been permitted by God, but not desired by Him with the will to approval? The Gospel abolished the Law of Talion, abolished concubinage, etc. Christ abolished a great number of things exercising His sovereignty over the Torah. In no form whatsoever does the Gospel make its own the sentiments reflected by no less a person than David in a Psalm where he understands God is going to place his enemies as a footstool (cf. Ps 110:1). This was not a metaphor for humiliation, it was the historical reality of the Semitic world: the prisoners were tied — often even mutilated— and over them was placed the throne of the king who placed his feet on the defeated (cf. Jos 10:24). This has never been condoned by Christianity in a positive way, and therefore, by God himself. However, Could we say that the religion of Israel was not legitimate?

There is no doubt many religious practices in religions are deformations, which one feels are depraved. However, with respect to this situation, it is necessary to make two observations. In the first place, the depravation depends in a greater part on the moral precepts held. In the second place, and above all, it is quite easy to charge a religion with a {356} multitude of practices their adherents can actually perform. We must not confuse religion with religious folklore. They are different things. How can one charge a religion for the numerous practices of magic, which may exist among its adherents? This is not meant as a criticism against the historians of religion. The reason is simple: outside Christianity —and perhaps Islam, and in a certain measure Buddhism— there is no rule, which may permit to discern between what is properly religious, and a deformation. Hence, it is excusable that we may find such a mass of religious facts encountered by the historians of religion in their sociology of religion. But this always leaves the question whether these religious practices belong strictly and formally to the content of a religion. A religion cannot be blamed —not even a polytheist one— saying it has magical practices: Does this proceed from the religion as such or from a completely natural mentality, which man has in that religion? The Israelites also employed soothsayers and consulted oracles. Because of this, Are we going to say that the religion of Israel was not legitimate?

The totality of religion as a historical body —each one of the historical bodies— is willed by God in a will to historical religion. The moment of approval and the moment of permission fall upon two moments of a religion, and not upon the objective body of religions, as if God in the will to approval had only willed Christianity, and simply permitted the other religions. God permits whatever there is of deformity in each religion. Nevertheless, He has had the positive will, that since religions are conformed in different historical bodies, man may really and actually access to the One and Triune God by means of graces deposited in the depths of that very religion. There is no {357} exception to this, not even the fact, to be recognized eventually in the history of religions, of an era in which the state of personal conscience of one having no religion at all is not an isolated phenomenon, but acquires the characteristics of a collective phenomenon. Consequently, it must be recognized that in the ordering of personal conscience, from the point of view of Christianity, despite any amount of deformity, there is inscribed a movement of real and actual access to the One and Triune God, in the graces deposited in the very rectitude with which man obeys his own conscience.

6) Then, one asks the question, Why must there be, in that will to historical religion, different objective bodies in history? Above all, we must not forget that as diverse as the objective bodies of religion may be, all of them are inscribed in three ways: the way of dispersion, the way of immanence, and the way of transcendence. Therefore, these three ways, strictly speaking, are just ways, i.e., options, which man puts into effect among the possibilities, which God offers for being understood in a manner more or less confused. Because they are possibilities accepted and appropriated by each people, men turn these possibilities into as many ways. Hence, the three ways are intrinsically historical. That the three may be historical means they are not only three ways consisting in the appropriation of possibilities, which in a more or less turbid way the divine reality offers, but that these three possibilities are congeneric and co-radical. In the end, this is the human condition: God has willed that man be a historical reality. However, granted this volition, it is undeniable that this historical structure of man must inexorably lead to objectively different formulas, to {358} different religions. Therefore, the will to religion adopts, from the side of God, a strictly historical form. It is a will to incorporation of graces and the supernatural destiny into distinct forms objectively different.

The will to historical religion is, at one and the same time, permissive will, and will to conformity because deep down and formally it is a will to form-ness. The different objective bodies, the different religions, are objective conformations of an historical process, which really and actually leads to the Christian God, who has deposited in the depths of these different objective bodies sufficient and necessary graces. It does lead, not despite religion, but —on the contrary— because of it, and despite the deformities found in it. The way of access to the Christian God is intrinsically historical. It would have been so under any hypothesis, even in the case the “religion of Adam” had remained standing upon Earth. There would have been no different religions; no history of the multiple religions, but there would have been a history of the single religion. Because that religion to which man would have remained attached would have been really, actually, and in addition inexorably historical. Is not that what Christianity itself has been, and still is in history?

The will to historical religion is, from the part of God, at one and the same time, will to historical form-ness, and will to historical way. In the oneness of these two moments is the internal structure of the divine will to historical religion. Since this will is a will to access the Christian God, and the collation of graces inside each objective body is real and actual, the consequence is that man throughout history finds himself historically situated inside a diversity. Yet, it is the diversity of ways, which lead to God, which has a {359} completely defined expression in the term used by St. Paul: pselapháo, search groping (cf. Acts 17:27). “Search groping” is not simply a natural moment of the human spirit who does not know what God is, in such a fashion that the one who finds Him or has the grace to find Him, is the one who has the religion, which leads to truth, while the others are nothing but permitted. Not at all: that search is in itself the result of a “craving” grace, which has desired to be really and actually historical, through which man, in his search, is realizing an essentially supernatural search: as supernatural as the terminus towards which he is advancing, and as supernatural as the grace he has to access it. Man does not receive graces despite his religions, but rather in and because of the religions. Moreover, God rests permissively on the deformities existing in the historical form-ness of each of the religions, in order to take them to Him. The history of religions is not the history of human aberrations. It is just the opposite: it is, in its own way, a revelation in act.

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¹ In the 1965 Madrid seminar Zubiri included in this last part some reflections on the will of God with respect to religions. These considerations did not appear in the 1971 seminar, which we now offer as an appendix.
² On the margin Zubiri writes: “ab-errant > deform” (Sp. “ab-errantes > deformes”).
³ In the 1965 Barcelona seminar Zubiri pointed out: “By repeatedly distinguishing the will to approval from the permissive will, one eventually dissociates them and they end up being considered as two wills. However, they are only one. I am not referring to the fact that both are physically one: in God as an infinitely simple being, everything —the two wills, and the entire will, and the intelligence— is one reality, infinitely simple, and in addition identical. I do not refer to this. I refer —sit venia verbo— to the intentional dimension of the divine will. Does God have two intentions or only one, which involves an approval dimension, and a permissive dimension? That is the question”.
⁴ Zubiri refers to a note, which reads: “God is always revealed in all men and in all religions. This revelation is a manifestation. It is not a simple unveiling, but a dynamic manifestation: it is a going towards Christ. As a consequence, all religions and all men have graces in their religion, and in their conscience to save themselves in Christ”.
⁵ Cf. K. Rahner, “Das Christentum und die nichtchristlichen Religionen”, in Schriften zur Theologie, vol. IV, Einsiedeln, 1962, pp. 136-158, specially p. 147ff.